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LAWRENCEEconometrics of
oea1 nf I ati on, 1965—1974:
A Review of the
Decade
Thedecade ending December 31, 1974, has been a turbulent one
in the history of postwar inflation. It is ending on a strong upbeat
that has caused econometricians to take some new hard looks at
their models because they, together with most other economists,
failed to foresee the magnitude of the present spurt.
We often tend to magnify contemporary problems, claiming that
present issues are more complicated than ever, making analysis
especially difficult. Today's problems are certainly not simple, but
it isDquestionable whether they are any worse than usual, particu-
larly when the outstanding ones are viewed in relation to the
others. In analyzing inflation since World War II, we have had to
deal with postwar decontrol, the Marshall Plan, the Korean War,
the closing of the Suez Canal, major European currency revalua-
tions, U.S. stockpiling, and a number of other major complications.
In the present paper, we are faced with the job of disentangling
the effects of Vietnam, New Economic Policy (NEP) controls, dollar
devaluation, reclosing of Suez, tripling or quadrupling of crude oil
NOTE: Vincent Su provided much material and insight for the analysis of price and
wage relationships during the NEP period.
35prices, massive crop failures in the USSR, and many other compli- TABLE
cating circumstances. It is unquestionably a difficult period, and -.
givesus reason to think again about fundamental model structure,
F
butit is probably not worse by a different order of magnitude than
the two preceding postwar decades.
Ultimately, the inflation record gets registered in price statistics; —
butin order to understand the econometrics of price formation, it is 1965
helpful to look simultaneously at other market-determined van- 1966
ables, namely, wage and interest rates. The prices of factors play 1967
strategic roles in determining the prices of goods. 1968
In Table 1, annual values are given for three major price indexes, 1969
an overall hourly earnings rate, and the Treasury bill rate. In 1970
Table 2, some sensitive and strategic components of the various 1971
price indexes are separately listed. Although a great deal of econo- 1972
metric analysis is concerned with short-mn analysis by quarters or
even months, the broad outlines here are given by years for corn
______
pactnessin presentation. The full flavor of the decade's events is SOURCE
given by an annual presentation. aEstimat
Prices, by any of the three indexes in Table 1, showed the influ-
ence of Vietnam War burdens, growing by more after 1965 than in
the early 1960s; but they picked up considerably in 1973, and more
so in 1974. Wholesale prices appear to have been a leader in 1973 A.
and have kept right on increasing in 1974. Wage rates, according
to the hourly earnings series in Table 1, showed a steady, modestly
growing increment until 1974 and are shooting up forcefully now in
TABLE1ADecadeof Market Rates:Prices,Wages,Interest
ConsumerWholesale
GNP Price Price NonagriculturalTreasury
Deflator Index Index Earnings Bill Rate
(1958 = 100)(1967 = 100)(1967 = 100)(dol. per hr.)(percent)
1965 110.9 94.5 96.6. 2.45 3.95
1966 113.9 97.2 99.8 2.56 4.88
1967 117.6 100.0 100.0 2.68 4.32
1968 122.3 104.2 102.5 2.85 5.34
1969 128.2 109.8 106.5 3.04 6.68
1970 135.2 116.3 110.4 3.22 6.46
1971 141.6 121.3 113.9 3.4:3 4.35
1972 146.1 125.3 119.1 3.65 4.07
1973 154.3 133.1 134.7 3.92 7.04














SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, various issues.
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Deflator:









1965 103.4 94.4 98.7 99.3
1966 105.6 99.1 95.3 105.9 105.7
1967 106.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1968 107.7 103.6 105.7 102.5 101.6
1969 110.8 108.9 113.8 109.1 108.4
i970 119.2 114.9 123.7 111.0 112.3
1971 125.0 118.4 130.8 112.9 115.0
1972 133.6 123.5 135.9 125.0 127.6
1973 155.6 141.4 141.8 176.3 174.0
j9748 219.7 161.7 152.0 187.7 176.0
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, various issues.
°Estimate.
order to recoup some lost ground, as a result of a most unusual
American situation in which real wages fell during 1974.
Interest rates behave differently from most of the other market
variables; they occasionally come down. The pattern in Table 1 is
definitely up, but some declines occurred in 1967 and 1971—1972.
Basic commodity prices exhibit this kind of behavior, too. They
often fall in the short run. Interest rates were not different from
prices, however, in that they rose to record high levels in the most
inflationary period, 1973—1974.
When we look at component indexes, in Table 2, it is apparent
that import prices show strong effects of dollar devaluation and
rising commodity prices. Food and crude materials rise much faster
than general averages of consumer or wholesale prices, as do many
services. The latter index has significant wage and interest com-
ponents that account for its rapid rise in recent years.
Price behavior in econometric models must respond to move-
ments in raw material prices, factor prices, exchange rates, major
world events, and domestic controls if we are to be able to interpret
recent events and to be better prepared for future price projections
than we have been in the past. In this period, apart from a brief
flurry in 1965, there have not been major changes in indirect taxes,
but the future may bring value-added taxes (VAT) or analogous
policy changes. It is clearly important to be prepared for them.
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It may appear superfluous to present a paper on the econometrics of
inflation at this time, since a book called The Econometrics of Price
Determination, based on a Federal Reserve—Social Science Re- an
search Council conference held in October 1970, was published W
just a few years ago.1 it is odd that we appear to be in need of seri- to
ous rethinking of the subject so soon after the conclusion of a sig- e
nificant and important conference on it, complete with a published ccl
record. The fact of the matter is that the considerations of the 1970 al
conference offered too little guidance on devaluation, food, fuel, ti
and other basic materials costs in the international transmission of Nj
inflation. all
The dominant specifications for price determination in U.S. ff4
econometric models were ably summarized at that conference in
overview papers by James Tobin and Saul Hymans. In a very gen- b
eral way, most of the major macroeconometric models determine
price as a markup over unit labor cost, with some allowance for
demand pressure. In turn, they determine wage change as a func-
tion of unemployment rates and price change. e
Distinctions between normal and actual unit labor costs, ex-
pected and observed price change, demand pressure through spe-
cial variables like capacity utilization, order backlogs, inventory 04
position, normal and actual labor force occur in the special struc- ti
tural forms of the different models. These are nontrivial refine-





where p =price,w =wagerate, L =employment,X =output,
C,, =capacityutilization, U =unemployment,and e,,,e,,, =dis-
turbance.
This model implies a partial Phillips-curve relation between
tXw/w and U for a given value of p/p. If we fix the level or the rate
of growth of productivity (XIL) and the rate of capacity utilization
(C,,), we can, by substitution, derive a trade-off relationship be-
tween the inflation rate (isp/p) and U.2 It is better to take the analy-
sis further and obtain complete system solutions for iXplp and U as
functions of all the exogenous variables and initial conditions. At
any given time, these two solution values can be jointly varied
through common exogenous input changes, producing the trade-off
38
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L ¼relationship. These are presented for three models by Hymans and
individual authors in The Econometrics of Price Determination.3
It is easy to see how the degree of overall economic performance
as measured by the rate of unemployment or capacity utilization
will affect inflation according to these equations, and it is also easy
to see how wage costs will influence prices. It is less obvious how
exchange rates, indirect taxes, food costs, fuel costs, other materials
costs, and capital costs will influence the inflation rate. These are
all important in the immediate context. In complete system simula-
tions, many of these factors and government policies, including
NEP, may affect price solutions by various indirect routes. These
are all important but probably not enough to explain the extreme
inflation of 1973—1974.
Most macroeconometric models are designed to explain one
basic price, say, the manufacturing, nonagricultural, or GNP price
level, and thento relate each separate price level to the main price.
e This is close to the procedure followed in financial analysis. One
basic interest rate, the Treasury bill or commercial paper rate, is
explained in a market behaviorial equation, and other rates are
made functions of the basic rate in term structure equations.
The basic price equation is customarily a markup on wage and
other costs, with an allowance for demand pressure, like the equa-
tion above. Prices of major final demand components such as con-
sumer goods or services (and their subdivisions), producer goods,
exports, imports, and public purchases are related either to the cen-
tral price level directly or to the same explanatory variables that
• appear in the equation for the central price. Allowance is also made
for special factors, such as individual tax rates and subsidies or
restrictions in particular markets. There are, however, some basic







IF where X =realGNP, p =implicitdeflator of GNP, Gith com-
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Lponent of GNP on the expenditure side, q1 =implicitdeflator of
G, Xvalue added in theith sector, and p =implicitdeflator
of X1. If there isa directequation for p, one element of qj and one
element ofp will beresidually computed from the identities.
Alternatively, all elements of can be directly modeled, and p will
be determined by identities. Import prices will generally be as-
sumed to be exogenous.
Nordhaus4 has conveniently outlined specffications for price
equations corresponding to different production functions: fixed
proportions, 'c0bbDouglas, and constant elasticity of substitution
(CES). There are two significant characteristics of his formulas that
should be mentioned separately. He introduces materials inputs
explicitly into his production functions; therefore, his output vari-
able should be interpreted as gross real output and not value
added, as implied in the preceding formulation. This is important
for showing how changes in materials input prices affect output
price.
The second feature of Nordhaus's formulation is that his price
equations are derived as semireduced forms, obtained by substitut-
ing product demand and marginal productivity conditions into the
production functions and rearranging terms to express output price
as a function of three input prices: wage rate, capital rental, and
materials price. Productivity is introduced as a neutral time func-
tion that is solved for explicit representation in the price equation.
The usual procedure, outlined in the previous section, is to use
unit labor cost (wL/X) as a combined variable showing both wage
and productivity (output per man-hour) effects all at once. In the
Cobb-Douglas case, there is nothing wrong in using this variable in
a price equation, together with other marginal conditions, produc-
tion functions, and demand functions as separate simultaneous
equations. These should give the same system results as Nordhaus's
semireducedpriceequations,providedthatallstochastic
properties are carefully watched on substitution and reduction.
Similar propositions would hold for other production functions.
The point is that legitimate transformations and combinations
within simultaneous equation systems can be made without having
any essential effects on the outcome, although the apparent struc-
ture may look different and convey different degrees of information
about the underlying system.
There is much simplicity and elegance in Nordhaus's specifica-
tions, however, and they are convenient for showing how each
input price makes a marginal contribution to final output price, at




















1of form is p =f(w, q, v, Y, t),wherep = output price, w = wage rates,
q = capital rental, v = materials price, Y = consumer income, and
t = time trend (productivity effect).
This formulation is highly desirable for partial or satellite model
11 studies in which the production process has a small number of
materials inputs. Agriculture with feed, seed, fertilizer would be a
case in point. Energy industries with intermediate fuel input would
be another. However, for outputs in a general system, itwillprob-
ably be advisable to make use of an input-output approach, as
sketched immediately below.
at The basic I/O equation, (1 —A)X =F,relates the gross output
ts vector X to the final demand vector F through the technology
matrix A. The matrix 1 is the identity matrix. We shall define two
other matrices, X = BY and F = CG, where Y is a vector of values
it added by the producing sector and C is a vector of GNP corn-






In the present context itisa diagonal matrix of markup factors,
showing how value added must be factored up to equal gross out-
• put. If we multiply an element of X by an element of B, we show
•.c how much must be subtracted from gross output in order to obtain
value added. The matrix C is constructed from the composition of
final demand deliveries by sector. Let us consider m types of final
demand, ranging from consumption through investment and public
g purchases to exports.
• F1 = F11 + F12 + .+Fim
F2 = F21 + F22 + ...+F2,,,
1 F,, = F,,, + F,,2 + •..+Fnm
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Ea'I J=1,2...,m
sec
If we divide each F1 by its corresponding column sum, we have the co
matrix re
IIFj/> FkjII ha
From the matrix equation (1 —A)BY =CG,we can derive Y =
B-'(J
—A)CG,which expresses how elements of G are trans-
formed into elements of Y. This is called a row transformation be- va
cause rowelements of B'(I —AY1Cexpress Y as a weighted sum of co elements of G. The sum of Y elements define GNP and so, also, the
sum of Gelements. We should modify this for appropriate treat-
ment of imports as separate elements of Y, either combined with al competitive goods produced domestically or in a separate corn- b ponent if they are noncompetitive. The elements of G, therefore, d sum to GNP plus imports, or total supply of goods and services
available.
A current-price accounting identity is p 'Y =q'G. This says that
the total of available supply measured as current value added plus T
imports equals the total current value of GNP plus imports. The
row vector p' is a vector of value-added prices, and q' is a vector of
implicit GNP deflators.
By substitution we have the identity
p'B'(I—A)'CG=q'C
This identity must hold for all values of G; therefore, we can write I
pd=q '1
Theseare column transformations of p into q. They express each ei
q1 as a column-weighted sum of the elements of p. The weights iS.
come from the columns of
h
p
The deflators of GNP components, or final demand prices, are,
therefore, weighted averages of all sector prices, many of which ti
are intermediate goods and some of which are imported goods.
They are elements of p corresponding either to a (noncompetitive)
import row or to goods whose characteristics are like those of im- S
ported world goods. In general, we would expect movements in e
42 Kleinr
domesticprices to follow world prices for nearly identical goods.
Equations to explain sector prices in such a model should include
international factors that affect domestic prices. Price equations by
sector of origin of production should be markup relations on sector
costs, as indicated above, but they should be modified by variables
representing supply-demand balance. In the cases of sectors that
have large competitive import components, it is important to in-
clude world price conditions for the commodity line in question.
In all cases, indirect tax rates, tariffs, and other special exogenous
= variablesshould be included in the sector price relationships.
The price conversion or column problem has been outlined for
e- value-added prices. These are more available in a neat social ac-
of counting sense as deflators of gross product originating by sector,
i.e., as deflators of X when its elements are measured in current
it prices. Although data may be less available on a large scale across
th all sectors, itismore straightforward to explain price of gross output





us This can be transformed to
=pL +
p*=p(i_ ai)+,
te In matrix notation this becomes p' =B'p +Ap*. The relation be-
tween p' and p can be written as p' =(I—A')' B' p.
We thus have a system of equations to transform prices of value
added, p, into prices of gross output, or vice versa. As long as the
elements ofA are constant, itdoesnot matter whether the analysis
ts is carried out in terms of prices of gross output or of value added.
The crux of the matter, however, is to model changes in A (and
hence B) and also in C. This is needed in order to construct com-
plete models that combine both I/Oandmacroeconomic analysis.
e, This is the kind of model building and price explanation started in
the Brookings model and implemented on a large scale by Ross
s. Preston.6
e) If there are complete equation sets for wage and other costs by
sector, in a combined 1/0—macromodel system, price equations for
in each sector with conversion into price deflators of final demand
Econometricsof Inflation, 1965—1974: Review of Decade 43would seem to provide a full explanation of the pricing process. In
addition to cost factors in price determination by sector, there
should be equations for inventories or other measures of demand
pressure, such asorder backlogs or capacity utilization, to complete
the explanation.
There is, however, another approach to input-output analysis that
appears to befeasible and promising for price determination,
namely, through the use of rectangular input-output systems.7
Let
Xf =outpUtof the ith commodity, i =1,2,..., m
outputof thejth sector,j =1, 2,. .., n
F=vectorof final demand











Typical elements of A and Rare
=.-= inputof the ith commodity per unit of output of thejth sector
rj = = shareof sector i in the output of commodityj.
We can compute total output of each commodity from
X =ARX +F
= (1—ARt' F
This should give "target" or "desired" amounts of X. Call them X".
Dynamicprice formation equations can then be formulated as
= x (X—X,-)
Other adjustment equations would also be possible.
The elements ofA and R might, in the first instance, be assumed
to be constant. This would be in the spirit of conventional I/O
analysis. A more elaborate theory could be constructed to generate
time movements of aj and ruasdirect analogues of the systems that
have been developed to generate movements in conventional I/O
matrices, assuming a specific underlying production function, such
as Cobb-Douglas, CES, or some other.8
44 KleinEn ECONOMETRIC EXPERIENCE
re In the inflationary decade, how did econometric analysis of prices
fare? There are several different ways of looking at this question.
e The first will be to examine the residuals from estimated price
equations to see whether "unexplained" variation is random or
a whether it shows a systematic tendency to be positive and increas-
ing during the period of acceleration of inflation. This tendency can
be examined for the whole decade or for any subperiod of particular
interest from the viewpoint of inflation. It will be a matter of sep-
arating systematic variation that can be "explained" by variables in
the price formation equations, as outlined above, from residual
variation.
A second approach will be to examine complete system simula-
tion residuals to see how well price movements are interpreted in
an inflationary era within the sample period of equation estimation,
in extrapolation (ex post), and in genuine forecast simulations.
Finally, system response to external disturbances can be investi-
gated, particularly price responses to disturbances that would be
naturally associated with inflation. These responses will be investi-
gated by means of hypothetical simulations.
)r The vehicle for econometric study in this paper will be the
Wharton model. During the period under consideration, this model
has gone through three major changes of updating, elaboration,
respecification, and comprehensive re-estimation. This means that
one single set of price equations, definitions of price variables, or
model simulations cannot be used for the whole period of analysis.
Also, within a given model, some changes were made in specifica-
tion of the price equation alone when inflationary problems became
so severe that deficiencies were brought to light. Record keeping
for actual forecast performance is relatively recent, especially in
terms of detail; consequently, more information is available for the
past few years than for the whole decade.
There are two principal price variables in the Wharton model.
One is the price of manufacturing output, originally the wholesale
price index of nonfarm, nonfood products, and later taken to be the
implicit deflator of value added in manufacturing.9 The other is the
implicit GNP deflator. As explained in an earlier section, the price
of manufacturing output is obtained directly from a behavioral
equation for price formation, while the GNP deflator is obtained
from a definitional relation as a ratio of nominal to real GNP. The
separate deflators of the components of GNP depend principallyon
the price of manufacturing output or on things related to it. In that
Econometricsof Inflation, 1965—1974: Review of Decade 45sense, both price variables give similarinformation as indicators of prj
inflation. When residual analysis is considered, the price index of co
manufacturing output will be the variable to take into account. For trq
system simulation, however, it will be preferable to use the GNP trq
deflator because it has remained as a conceptually stable statistical bu
series through the successive variants of the model, while the Tit
manufacturers' price has changed from time to time and provides a mf
variable rather than a fixed standard of reference. dri
In the latest version of the Wharton model, Mark IV, there are
many sector prices, and manufacturing isdisaggregated into
durable and nondurable components. The equations for these two
prices follow the usual markup over normal unit labor costs, pres-
sure of capacity utilization, and lags. The residuals determined in
fitting these equations to a given series of price data show no
tendency toward acceleration in 1965—1966 or in the most recent —
period.They do not even show clearly the effects of the freeze and 1
successive phases. Residuals for these periods are not funda-
mentally different from those of earlier periods. The largest 1
residuals, in absolute value, occur in 196011 and l.9531V (see
Table 3 and Figure 1). The root-mean-square residual is 0.97 over
the whole eighty-quarter span. In the ten quarters of NEP (through
19731V), there are five positive and five negative residuals. One is
1
markedly larger (twice as large) and one is markedly smaller
(almost zero) than 0.97. It thus appears that standard price behavior
1
FIGURE1Estimated Residuals, Price Equation for Durable
Manufactures, 1953111-1 9731V
iieilit iIiIiiiii ItI 1111111111 II111111111 Iliii!iii1111111111 Iiii Iii
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SOURCE:Table 3.
















Actual Predicted Residual Error
prevailed in the sense that the ratio of prices to normal unit labor
cost (adjusted for indirect taxes) changed as capacity pressures and
trends changed, without any special effects evident from the con-
trol program. It is not to be assumed that controls were ineffective,
but only that they did not alter the basic price-wage relationship.
The basic movement of durable goods prices was upward in this
most recent period, but nondurables showed practically no positive
drift (before 1974).
TABLE 3 Estimated Residuals: Price Equation for Durable
Manufactures, 1953111-1 9731V
(1958 = 100.0)
1953111 1254126 125.8060 —0.3934 —0.3137
IV 123.3722 125.4495 —2.0773 —1.6838
19541 124.0760 123.1132 0.9629 0.7760
II 123.7466 123,6375 0.1091 0.0882
III 124.8748 123.2437 1.6310 1.3061
IV 123.3665 124.5042 —1.1377 —0.9222
19551 123.9643 123.6431 0.3212 0.2591
II 125.7042 124.5406 1.1636 0.9257
III 127.4427 126.1300 1.3127 1.0300
IV 129.4395 127.7663 1.6731 1.2926
19561 129.1452 129.4465 —0.3013 —0.2333
II 128.0792 129.1316 —1.0524 —0.8217
III 125.9323 127.8497 —1.9174 —1.5225
IV 127.3130 126.2724 1.0406 0.8173
19571 128.5383 127.4605 1.0778 0.8385
II 128.0407 128.2416 —0.2008 —0.1569
III 127.4938 127.6005 —0.1068 —0.0837
IV 126.2587 126.4548 —0.1961 —0.1553
19581 124.2166 124.5767 —0.3601 —0.2899
II 121.4175 122.4966 —1.0791 —0.8887
III 120.7651 120.3612 0.4039 0.3344
IV 120.5551 120.3006 0.2545 0.21 11
19591 121.6083 120.6296 0.9787 0.8048
II 123.0978 122.1443 0.9536 0.7746
III 122.8239 122.7762 0.0477 0.0388
IV 121.8633 122.5775 —0.7142 —0.5861
19601 120.9747 122.5491 —1.5744 —1.3014
II 118.7809 121.2742 —2.4933 —2.0991
III 118.5744 119.0243 —0.4499 —0.3794
IV 117.7539 118.4637 —0.7098 —0.6028-r - TAcou)
Percent
Actual Predicted Residual Error
1961! 118.2795 117.3586 0.9209 0.7786
118.7195 118.2013 0.5182 0.4365
iii 118.9835 118.8409 0.1426 0.1199
Iv 118.6437 119.2680 —0.6243 —0.5262
19621 117.9422 119.0230 —1.0809 —0.9164
II 118.7131 118.4495 0.2636 0.2221
III 118.6416 119.1371 —0.4955 —0.4177
Iv 118.4379 119.0582 —0.6203 —0.5237
19631 118.1565 118.9481 —0.7916 —0.6700
II 118.8988 118.8013 0.0976 0.0821
III 119.5757 119.3902 0.1854 0.1551
IV 119.6642 120.0176 —0.3534 —0.2953 N
19641 120.8154 120.0330 0.7824 0.6476
II 121.9981 121.1262 0.8719 0.7147
III 121.3767 122.2236 —0.8469 —0.6978
IV 121.9204 121.5457 0.3748 0.3074
19651 123.1586 122,3112 0.8474 0.6880
II 124.3382 123.4684 0.8697 0.6995
III 125.6508 124.5686 1.0822 0.8612
IV 126.2353 125.7332 0.502 0.3978
19661 127.7717 126.3893 1.3824 1.0820
II 127.5114 127.7793 —0.2679 —0.2101
III 127.3401 121.4034 —0.0634. —0.0498
IV 127.2633 127.0924 0.1710 0.1343
19671 127.4125 126.5197 0.8928 0.7007
II 126.6686 126.4932 0.1754 0.1385
III 125.2273 125.7032 —0.4759 —0.3800
IV 125.6008 124.3657 1.2351 0.9834
19681 124.5636 124.7522 —0.1886 —0.1514
II 123.7671 123.8074 —0.0403 —0.0325
III 122.4730 123.0098 —0.5368 —0.4383
IV 121.0939 121.8188 —0.7250 —0.5987
19691 120.6635 120.6559 0.0076 0.0063
II 118.7186 120.2429 —1.5243 —1.2840
III 117.2443 118.5132 —1.2690 —1.0823
IV 118.0294 116.9108 1.1186 0.9477
19701 118.3183 117.1710 1.1473 0.9697
II 116.6899 117.4107 —0.7208 —0.6177
III 114.3406 115.8010 —1.4604 —1.2772
IV 113.9969 113.0752 0.9217 0.8085 S!
19711 111.8324 113.0841 —1.2517 —1.1192 t




Actual Predicted Residual Error
III 113.0688 112.0307 1.0381 0.9181
IV 112.9439 112.3633 0.5807 0.5141
1972! 113.1587 112.4791 0.6796 0.6006
II 114.0812 113.0315 1.0497 0.9201
III 113.6471 114.1450 —0.4979 —0.4381
IV 112.7246 114.1034 —1.3788 —1.2232
1973! 113.0352 113.4429 —0.4077 —0.3607
II 114.7964 113.8138 0.9826 0.8560
III 113.5130 115.3444 —1.8314 —1.6134
IV 113.8616 113.9509 —0.0893 —0.0785
NOTE:Durbin-Watson statistic =1.69145.
In the following estimated OLS equation the figures in paren-
these are t ratios; the residuals are shown in Table 3:
(1 -R)PXMDINULCD=10.62-0.019t
(2.82)(3.15)




PXMD =indexof the price of output originating in durable manufac-
turing (1958 =100)
R=averagerate of indirect business taxes (federal)
NULCD =normalunit labor costs (ratio of wage rate to twelve-quarter
trailing average of productivity in durable manufacturing)
CPMD =Whartonindex of capacity utilization in durable manufac-
turing
NCPMD =twelve-quartertrailing average of CPMD
Another way of looking at residuals is in single-equation extrap-
olation beyond the sample period, where observed values are sub-
stituted for the explanatory variables, and the residual differences
between observed and estimated price are tabulated. It is standard
practice in forecasting with the Wharton model to evaluate resid-
uals in this manner for the eight quarters just preceding each new
set of quarterly forecasts. The purpose of this calculation is to de-
tect drift in behavioral patterns, structural change, or the influence
of data revisions. While this procedure is now systematic, older



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-cords do not exist and, therefore, the values tabulated in Table 4
are given only for the period since May 1971. Each row in the table
has two reference times: the date at which the residuals are com-
puted and the period for which the residuals are computed.
There is a break in the tabulated values because a new price
equation was introduced in April 1973 in order to take better ac-
count of the inflationary impact of import prices under exchange
devaluation, to make better estimates of normal unit labor costs,
and to sharpen the nonlinear effects of capacity utilization. Prior to
April 1973, the price equation used generally underestimated ac-
tual prices. After the new equation was introduced, the residuals
turned negative, indicating that the new equation overestimated
prices.
With the old equation, the residuals show no regular tendency to
grow. The residual for the fourth quarter of 1971 is generally quite
small. This period has the full effect of the freeze and Phase II. It is
the first full quarter after the introduction of NEP (August 15,
1971). The residuals get larger in absolute value after the beginning
of 1973, but as they are all negative, they do not show the effects of
growing inflation that the price equation might have failed to
reflect.
The Mark IV residuals for all separate price equations in the con-
trol period provide information both on extrapolation and on
aspects of the effectiveness of the controls. Table 5 contains re-
siduals for individual quarters from 1971111 through 197411 for each
price variable by sector of origin, and the period is blocked off into
NEP "phases." The sample period ends in 197111 for these calcula-
tions; they postdate those for Mark IV above in that they incor-
porate some recent data revisions.
This is a mixed pattern. Contract construction shows the restrain-
ing influence of wage agreements in that industry through the early
part of the extrapolation period. The results are largely negative
(price restraint) in agriculture, nondurable manufacturing, finance,
and services but are positive or mixed in other sectors. In most
cases, these tabulations refer to price movements in relation to
wage rates; therefore, it is worthwhile to look into the wage patterns
also. In addition, there is a general feeling that NEP was more
strongly directed at wage restraint than at overall restraint of prices
or nonlabor factor incomes.
Residuals from wage rate equations in the Wharton model,
Mark IV, extended beyond the sample, from 1971111 through
197411, are given in Table 6. As in the case of prices, the special
wage agreements in the construction sector show through clearly.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7There are predominantly negative residuals in the wage estimates
for this sector. The results in mining are for persistent positive
residuals. Most other sectors are mixed, although the regulated and
finance sectors tend to have negative residuals. There is no clear
evidence here that unduly depressed wage rates held down prices
or that wage rates were even associated directly with high prices
during the NEP period. Ii
If the sample is extended through 197411 so that NEP-phase e
periods are included, the corresponding tables of residuals are Si
liberally sprinkled with pius and minus entries across all sectors.
There is not even a definite tendency for contract construction to
have almost all negative residuals. This sector does, however, have
strongly negative price residuals through most of Phase II, a period
that ended during the last part of 1972. a
It is one thing to fit a single equation with small random residuals a:
or even to extrapolate a single equation with correct values for the
explanatory variables, and quite another to simulate a whole system
9 withestimated values for all endogenous variables. Three genera-
tions of Wharton models have been simulated over historical
sample periods, some covering all or part of the period of price
acceleration (from 1965 on) within the simulation period and some t
covering the acceleration period alone. e
For reference, let us consider the second generation of Wharton I
models.1° For a simulation horizon of one quarter, the root-mean- a
square error of the GNP deflator in index points for 194911—19641V a
was 0.48; for two quarters, 0.74; for three quarters, 0.89; and for four a
quarters, 0.99. For the corresponding complete system for Mark n
III, next generation, for 19601—19701, the figure for a one-quarter c
horizon was 0.25; for two quarters, 0.39; for three quarters, 0.52;
and for four quarters, 0.71. This latter is probably a more difficult ii
period to reproduce because it includes the accelerating inflation, o
but more effort was directed at price determination because of the c
recognition of forecast difficulties in the applications of the older c
model. The errors for Mark III are uniformly lower than those of the s
earlier-generation model. For the earlier acceleration period, c
19651—19701, alone, the twenty-quarter dynamic simulation of h
Mark III generated a root-mean-square error of 1.24 index points. S
In the extension of the simulation horizon to cover eight quarters,
rather than four, the error grows to about one full index point. In ti
extrapolation, however, the error is much larger—about two to three g
times as large as the within-sample errors. Extrapolation of the p
Mark III model over the period 197011—19721V generates the fol- ii
lowing root-mean-square errors: e
54 Klein1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.72 0.96 1.04 0.80 1.02 1.41 1.99 2.73
In the first year of extrapolation, it is iiecessary to reckon wth an
error of at least one full index point in an inflationary period. In the
second year ahead, this error allowance must amount to at least two
full index points. It will be seen, below, that these limits are too
narrow in application to genuine ex ante prediction during the
much stronger inflationary period extending to early 1974.
The latest generation of Wharton models is just being introduced,
and preliminary simulations of complete systems show the prev-
alence of errors amounting to over two full index points in the
second year of two-year simulations. The period covered is one
of accelerating inflation. When these calculations are extended
beyond the range of Table 7,rightup to the double-digit periods in
1974, the errors get larger—as much as five index points. A strong
effort has been made to improve the mechanism of price determina-
tion in the model, but a sizable error persists. Errors greatly in
excess of two index points do not occur with any frequency through
1973, but in 1974 the price explosion exceeds model capabilities,
and truly large errors appear. The largest discrepancies occur right
after the termination of controls, but complications of oil prices,
oversized trade deficits, and dollar weakness are not to be
neglected in the analysis and in the attempt to draw definite con-
clusions about the reasons for the underestimate of inflation.
The preceding tabulations have dealt with performance after
the fact, either in the sample-fitting period or in a period after that
of the sample extrapolation period, but both are hypothetical exer-
cises. It is interesting to examine how well the model as a whole
could genuinely predict the rate of inflation in realistic forecast
situations. Detailed records are available for Wharton model fore-
casts from 1967. The forecasts were made regularly from 1963 on,
but careftil record keeping was not instituted in the earlier years.
Some summary statistics are available, but period-by-period fore-
casts from the "control" solutions are difficult to recover sys-
tematically before 1967. The tabulation figures in Table 8 are
grouped by quarters into annual forecasts in order to make the
presentation more compact. The quarterly record is available but is
no more illuminating than the annual results made at each year's
end for two years into the future.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7The annual story is one of consistent underestimation of inflation,
improving at each year's one-year-ahead revision of the prior
two-year-ahead forecast but generally yielding a figure below the
actual inflation rate. The figures in Table 8 are for the GNP deflator,
which gives a good summary picture of inflation running ahead of
the model.
In 1970 and 1972 the one-year-ahead prediction was quite close,
but in the other years, there was a consistent underestimate. The
largest inflationary increment, in 1973—1974, was seriously under-
stated in terms of the level of the variable predicted, but the
increment between the two years was much closer to the actual
amount because both years were systematically biased. This is an
example of the general finding that forecasts of change are more
accurate than forecasts of level if the latter are systematically
biased. This is what has happened in forecasting price movements
in recent years.
The main conclusions would not be different if we were to
tabulate the results by quarters rather than by years. General
results for the whole period, in quarterly forecasting, are shown in
Table 9. These show small size and growth of errors in change form
but larger error values in level form, especially for the second year
of a two-year forecast horizon. A closer examination of the period
since the imposition of controls is given in the second and fourth
lines of the table. That this is a more difficult period to predict is
shown by the enlargment of the error values in most cases. Two
years ahead, errors have been as large as four to five index points,
while the error of prediction of change has usually been under 1.5




































Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8






























index points. The kind of inflation surprises that have disturbed
most people—householders, business people, and public authori-
ties—have been unexpected additional rates of five or more index
points; therefore these short-run errors are serious. An upper limit
of tolerable error should be about 1.5 index points, preferably one
index point; therefore, room for improvement exists.
The sensitivity of complete-system solution to external shocks in
the form of world price changes is of interest in trying to associate
domestic price changes with those in world markets. Accordingly,
the Wharton model forecast that was released on July 31, 1974, was
chosen as typical. It was used as a baseline case, and four major
external prices in the system were changed—the price index of im-
ported goods, the price index of imported services, an average of
foreign consumer price indexes, and the price index of world trade.
The first is an important explanatory variable in the equation for
goods imports and the next two are significant in the imports of
services. The fourth index is an important explanatory factor in the
export equation. The differences in the exogenous inputs can be
seen in Table 10.
In the table the level and growth rate of external prices in the
disturbed solution were set so that the input values at the end of the
simulation (eight quarters later) would be 98 percent of the base-
line cases in all four instances. These lower values reduce the cor-
responding price indexes of the baseline case by 4.4 to 4.8 index
points. The results on a central price variable, the price deflator of
output originating in manufacturing, are shown in the last two lines
of the table. The price was chosen because it is more sensitive to
external import prices. The GNP deflator hardly changes, certainly
Econometrics of Inflation, 1965—1974: Review of Decade 59
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7not significantly, between the two solutions. This is partly because
of the negative treatment of imports in adding up the elements of
the GNP.
There is a distinct lowering of the price of domestic manufactures
if world prices are lowered. The more that external prices are
lowered through time, the more domestic prices come down. At
the end of the simulation horizon (eight quarters later), when ex-
ternal prices are 98 percent of baseline values, simulation results
for the manufacturing deflator come down to 99.6 percent of the
baseline case: a fall of approximately 2 percent in external prices
results in a fall of approximately 0.4 percent in an important do-
mestic price. Most other defiators of output originating do not
change significantly.
DEFICIENCIESAND POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
Therecent inflation has been unkind to economists generally. No
matter who among them might claim that they saw inflation coming
as far back as 1965, they probably did not even consider its present
magnitude as a likely possibility. This remark applies to economic
analysts generally, whether they be econometricians or non-
econometricians, or whether they use monetary tools, fiscal tools,
productivity tools, or any other general approach to analysis of the
economy. Inflation was underestimated in severity, duration, and
general time shape.
In many respects this is a professional failure, and it should
provoke a response. To me, the natural response is not to ask for a
complete revamping of theoretical and statistical tools of economic
analysis, although some popular writers have jumped to this con-
clusion. As I look at the problem from the viewpoint of econometric
model building and attempts to forecast inflation, together with
many other performance characteristics of the economy, I see a
continuing need to make model formulations more detailed and
richer in terms of all the processes that can be accommodated. We
have come a long way in the past twenty years in integrating
monetary and interindustiy materials into econometric models. By
themselves, they add to the areas of understanding of the inflation
(and other) problems. We have not yet fully integrated national
income, input-output and flow-of-funds (F/F) accounts into one
complete model although we have made paired combinations of
national income accounts (NIA) with I/O and NIA with F/F. As our
Econometricsof Inflation, 1965—1974: Review of Decade 61data and understanding of model building progress, we are grad-
ually achieving this grand synthesis. Our NIA systems provide us
with the markups on labor and capital costs and capacity pres-
sures; our I/O systems add markups on materials costs (especially
strategic and imported materials); finally, our F/F systems show
longer-run influences of money and credit conditions. The present sj
inflation combines all these aspects.
Naturally, any model that encompasses all these factors will have t
to be large and detailed. This places us in the thousand-equation t
range. We are just learning how to handle such systems efficiently, t
and I really believe that this is the route to follow, instead of look-
ing for some breakthrough observation gained by respecification or
manipulation of small macro models. Inflation, or price movements
generally, are never purely a demand phenomenon, a cost phe-
nomenon, or a monetary phenomenon. The situation always in- NOT
volvesa strong mixture of several aspects. It is not generally pos-
sible to identify some particular line of the inflationary process in a
pure form.
Any narrow approach that concentrates on money supply is going
to miss some big influences coming from basic materials markets
or industrial capacity pressures. A focus solely on wage movements
will be equally liable to failure. We have witnessed so many infla-
tion avenues in the data, modeling, and performance since 1965
that it should be clear that we will have to allow for a wide variety of
channels in a large-scale model. This means building more realism
and detail into our existing systems and not attempting to build
some new macro theory or to add a twist to an existing one.
Given that future econometric research on the price formation
sectors of national models should continue along existing lines but
be elaborated in detail, as I have argued in this paper, there is still a
technical question remaining to be answered: Should we look back
historically on the period 1965—1974 in future tim series data
samples as one that was so disturbed that significant use of dummy
variables would be recommended in order to make the equations
conform more closely to reality?
This type of question has been finessed, not entirely legitimately,
for the Korean War period by starting up most time series investiga-
tions in econometric model building after 1954. After that period,
there were Kennedy-Johnson guidelines, the Vietnam War, the
various phases of NEP, the Soviet wheat deal, and the oil crises. At
the time of occurrence of these momentous events, special care and
adjustment were made to price-wage equations in order to interpret
contemporaneous movements in the economy. Retrospectively,
62
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- however,we do not find a need for widespread use of dummy van-
ables in order to eliminate outlying observations for the estimation
- ofprice equations covering the whole period from 1954 through
1974. It is possible that equations in some specific sectors, like the
contract construction sector, would show improvement if these
special periods, particularly the eras of Vietnam and NEP, were
"dumm led out," but the general nature of our findings suggests that
these periods will not appear to be so unusual in historical perspec-
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I639In the 1966 and 1968 versions of the Wharton model, the price of manufactur-
ing output was more central than in the present (Mark III) version introduced
in 1970. In the latter, the price of output of the regulated sector and, also, the ri
price of commercial output assumed some importance in overall price de- b
termination. In Mark IV, the newest version, there are many more sector prices.
10.L. B. Klein and M. K. Evans, The Wharton Econometric Forecasting Model, b








Inthis paper, Klein reviews ten very difficult years. In part, his
paper, like many others at this conference, is an exercise in eco-
nomic history, for he looks at the evidence concerning the effects
of the various game plans, NEPs, and phases of economic policy
over the last decade. And his paper is in part a postmortem for
d econometricmodels as well as for economic policy, for he reviews
the price predictions generated by econometric models over the
decade. He also advances certain methodological suggestions as
to how we might proceed to do better in the future.
It is fair to say that this was not econometrics' finest hour. The
basic structure, summarized by Klein early in his paper, custom- r
arily involves one equation relating price changes to labor costs
per unit of output and capacity utilization, and another explaining
wage changes in terms of unemployment and the speed of inflation.
Such a system was not well equipped for analyzing the cost-push
effects of currency devaluation and the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Klein reports that the control pro-
gram did not influence the basic price-wage relationship. However,
he does report that the construction industry did indeed exercise
restraint. Klein presents evidence showing that the successive re-
finements of the Wharton model led to improved predictive accu-
racy, but the annual story is one of consistent underestimation of
inflation. Using the most recent Wharton model, Klein presents a
Comments byLovelltwo-year simulation showing that a 2 percent moderation in the
rate of increase in the price of imports would slow the U.S. inflation
by about 0.4 percent.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Klein's paper concerns his
buoyant optimism about the future for large-scale econometric
models. At the beginning of the paper, he suggests that we should
not magnify contemporary problems, and indeed suggests that
every decade, not just the one under review, has had its share of
disrupting factors to befuddle the analyst. He does not argue that
present problems can be patched up with a mendacity parameter
reflecting the White House climate, and he warns against any at-
tempt to "dummy out" recent experience. Klein rejects single-
cause explanations, pointing out that inflation has involved a mix-
ture of cost-push, demand, and monetary elements. He does argue
that we are gradually approaching a Grand Synthesis involving the
integration of national income, input-output, and flow-of-funds
accounts into one complete model in the thousand-equation range.
The Grand Synthesis may involve a structure approaching the com-
plexity of microsimulation models advocated by Guy Orcutt. While
the track record for input-output quantity forecasts is such as to
suggest that we should not be overly optimistic about the useful-
ness of these techniques in predicting price movements, Klein will
allow for substitution effects by making the input-output coeffi-
cients responsive to changes in relative prices. Critics of Klein will
r doubtless argue that even 999 equations would be too many. My
own view is that we should not shave too closely with Bishop
Occam's razor. Because of the successive revolutions in computer
technology, an econometric model composed of 1,000-plus equa-
tions may be no more mind-boggling today than the twelve-equa-
tion Model III that Klein published in 1950. But in an era in which
research funds are again in short supply, it is interesting to observe
that techniques of analysis that competed in earlier decades for
foundation support are now appreciated as complementary modes
of analysis.
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